In the _Proslogion_, St. Anselm presents a philosophical argument for the existence of God. Anselm's proof, known since the time of Kant as the ontological argument for the existence of God, has played an important role in the history of philosophy and has been incorporated in various forms into the systems of Descartes, Leibniz, Hegel, and others. Included in this edition of the_ Proslogion _are Gaunilo's "A Reply on Behalf of the Fool" and St. Anselm's "The Author's Reply to Gaunilo." (...) All three works are in the original Latin with English translation on facing pages. Professor Charlesworth's introduction provides a helpful discussion of the context of the _Proslogion_ in the theological tradition and in Anselm's own thought and writing. (shrink)

While not taking St. Anselm’s ontological argument in the Proslogion to be valid, this paper shows that the dismissal of the thesis by both St. Thomas Aquinas and Kant does less than justice to St. Anselm’s text. In Chapter II of the Proslogion Anselm defines God as ‘something than which nothing greater can be thought’, claiming that this notion ‘exists in the mind’. The question is does its subject, God, exist ‘in re’. Can one proceed from the mental existence to (...) real existence given that to exist in re is greater than to exist notionally? This paper sets out several of Anselm’s premises from which he concludes that the notional existence of God defined by Anselm entails God’s actual existence, Aquinas dismissed Anselm’s arguments – possibly not having Anselm’s full text at hand. Anselm maintains that if ‘something than which nothing greater can be thought’ can be conceived, then to deny its existence in re constitutes a self-contradiction. The present paper examines in detail the elements of which Anselm’s elegant arguments are composed: q.v. Reference is made to Anselm’s Reply to Gaunilo, and to Anselm’s ontology set out in Monologion. Much, for the modern reader, turns on the topical logic of ‘perfection’ and of ‘greatness’. Again: much turns on the Kantian question ‘Is existence a predicate?’ And on the question: what kinds of things can be the subject of predicates? The comparison which Anselm is making between real and conceptual existence is not like any other comparison. This may be the flaw in his arguments. (shrink)

THE methodological principle known as Ockham’s Razor is usually formulated as “Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessarium”. However, it is well known that neither this formulation of the principle nor the idea behind it come originally from William of Ockham. This particular formula is due to Leibniz, though Ockham’s works contain equivalent formulas: “Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate”; “Si duae res sufficiunt ad eius veritatem, superfluum est ponere aliam rem”; “Frustra fit per plura, quod potest fieri per pauciora”. But (...) Duns Scotus had also used the same principle before Ockham and he refers it directly to Aristotle. If the Razor belongs to anyone then, it belongs to Aristotle, and the study of its exact meaning and value must begin with Aristotle’s views about it. It is interesting to note, in this respect, that the principle was recognized as Aristotle’s at least until the time of Galileo. Thus in his Dialogue concerning the Two chief World Systems Galileo supports his theory that “diurnal motion belongs to the earth alone rather than to the rest of the universe excepting the earth” by referring to “a very true maxim of Aristotle’s which teaches that ‘frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora’.”. (shrink)

THE methodological principle known as Ockham’s Razor is usually formulated as “Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessarium”. However, it is well known that neither this formulation of the principle nor the idea behind it come originally from William of Ockham. This particular formula is due to Leibniz, though Ockham’s works contain equivalent formulas: “Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate”; “Si duae res sufficiunt ad eius veritatem, superfluum est ponere aliam rem”; “Frustra fit per plura, quod potest fieri per pauciora”. But (...) Duns Scotus had also used the same principle before Ockham and he refers it directly to Aristotle. If the Razor belongs to anyone then, it belongs to Aristotle, and the study of its exact meaning and value must begin with Aristotle’s views about it. It is interesting to note, in this respect, that the principle was recognized as Aristotle’s at least until the time of Galileo. Thus in his Dialogue concerning the Two chief World Systems Galileo supports his theory that “diurnal motion belongs to the earth alone rather than to the rest of the universe excepting the earth” by referring to “a very true maxim of Aristotle’s which teaches that ‘frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora’.”. (shrink)

IN Chapter 6 of the Poetics Aristotle defines tragedy as.

The word for Professor Else’s book is “monumental”. It is monumental in size, monumental in its scope, in its scholarship and erudition, and in its general mastery of the most difficult of all Aristotle’s texts, the Poetics. And, in case this should give the impression that the book is over–solemn and pedantic, it may be remarked that Professor Else carries this monumental air lightly and easily; he writes with verve and shows a nice commonsense as he moves among the complexities (...) of Aristotle’s text and the complexities worse complicated of the commentators on the Poetics. In short, we now have a definitive commentary in English on Aristotle’s Poetics to take the place of the very unsatisfactory interpretations of Butcher and Bywater. (shrink)

The word for Professor Else’s book is “monumental”. It is monumental in size, monumental in its scope, in its scholarship and erudition, and in its general mastery of the most difficult of all Aristotle’s texts, the Poetics. And, in case this should give the impression that the book is over–solemn and pedantic, it may be remarked that Professor Else carries this monumental air lightly and easily; he writes with verve and shows a nice commonsense as he moves among the complexities (...) of Aristotle’s text and the complexities worse complicated of the commentators on the Poetics. In short, we now have a definitive commentary in English on Aristotle’s Poetics to take the place of the very unsatisfactory interpretations of Butcher and Bywater. (shrink)

Professor Körner’s essay on what he calls conceptual thinking is much more extensive in scope than its title suggests. Körner begins with a “logical”—as opposed to epistemological or psychological—discussion of the different kinds of concepts, “ostensive” and “non-ostensive”, and defines a concept as a sign used in accordance with rules. These rules, he emphasises, are not purely conventional, derived either from artificial formal languages or from “ordinary language” as the Linguistic Analysts claim. Thus he says that the claim of the (...) Analysts that a proposition is meaningless unless it has a role in ordinary language,” presupposes a criterion to decide whether, if a proposition cannot be expressed in some language, it is the proposition which is defective and not merely the language”. Körner’s position, therefore, differs in this respect from that of the Analysts, although his method is similar to theirs in that he claims that his enquiry is a purely neutral “logical” one involving no metaphysical or epistemological presuppositions or commitments and, in a sense, having no direct metaphysical or epistemological repercussions one way or the other. So, for example, when he says that an ostensive concept must have a “basis”,—that is, something to which it is applied—he does not mean that a concept, to be meaningful, must designate some ostensible “instance”. Thus, he admits, an Idealist might deny that there is any “instance” corresponding to the concept “physical object” while, nevertheless, acknowledging that his fountain pen is a “basis” of the concept “physical object”. In other words, Körner’s definition of the concept does not either directly sanction or rule out the Idealist epistemological position. (shrink)

Professor Körner’s essay on what he calls conceptual thinking is much more extensive in scope than its title suggests. Körner begins with a “logical”—as opposed to epistemological or psychological—discussion of the different kinds of concepts, “ostensive” and “non-ostensive”, and defines a concept as a sign used in accordance with rules. These rules, he emphasises, are not purely conventional, derived either from artificial formal languages or from “ordinary language” as the Linguistic Analysts claim. Thus he says that the claim of the (...) Analysts that a proposition is meaningless unless it has a role in ordinary language,” presupposes a criterion to decide whether, if a proposition cannot be expressed in some language, it is the proposition which is defective and not merely the language”. Körner’s position, therefore, differs in this respect from that of the Analysts, although his method is similar to theirs in that he claims that his enquiry is a purely neutral “logical” one involving no metaphysical or epistemological presuppositions or commitments and, in a sense, having no direct metaphysical or epistemological repercussions one way or the other. So, for example, when he says that an ostensive concept must have a “basis”,—that is, something to which it is applied—he does not mean that a concept, to be meaningful, must designate some ostensible “instance”. Thus, he admits, an Idealist might deny that there is any “instance” corresponding to the concept “physical object” while, nevertheless, acknowledging that his fountain pen is a “basis” of the concept “physical object”. In other words, Körner’s definition of the concept does not either directly sanction or rule out the Idealist epistemological position. (shrink)

Mr. M. P. Charlesworth seems to have been too sceptical when he remarked that ‘the names of the Indian princelets given in the Periplus are unidentifiable, or rather too easily identifiable with any one, to be of any use’. Actually, the ruler mentioned in ch. 41 is identifiable beyond reasonable doubt, and his date is practically certain.

Mr. M. P. Charlesworth seems to have been too sceptical when he remarked that ‘the names of the Indian princelets given in the Periplus are unidentifiable, or rather too easily identifiable with any one, to be of any use’. Actually, the ruler mentioned in ch. 41 is identifiable beyond reasonable doubt, and his date is practically certain.

Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s thinking about ethics and Christianity in his famous book Ethics, an unfinished and posthumously published work representing his most mature thought on the subject, is a fascinating attempt to combine different, and often conflicting, strands in the Christian intellectual tradition. In this article, I outline his thinking therein, analyse the advantages and disadvantages in his approach, and relate it to developments in contemporary philosophy. His critique of an excessive stress upon principles and abstraction in opposition to a concern (...) for concrete circumstances is, I argue, best seen as a necessary critique of what I call moralism rather than morality. It is also related to recent philosophical theories of particularism and the debates about ‘emergency ethics’ in current philosophy. On the negative side, Bonhoeffer has a tendency to treat non-Christian ethics as necessarily relativist and at times is excessively influenced by the elements in Christian theological tradition that are hostile to the natural and to non-Christian philosophy. In addition, his invocation of ‘the Divine mandates’ seems to have undesirable implications for some genuine values in liberal democratic theory and practice. (shrink)

This paper builds on Max Charlesworth’s evolving interest in aboriginal spirituality by reflecting on potential affinities, as well as great differences, between the notion of the indigenous songline and sacred texts. In particular I suggest possible parallels between the travels of a spirit ancestor along a particular route, and the account of the journey of a specific early Irish saint, itself modelled on the motif of the pilgrim within Jewish and Christian Scripture. Charlesworth always insisted that religion could (...) never be studied as an abstraction, outside its specific manifestation in a culture. I argue that a core element of any religious tradition is constituted not by belief, but by song. Sacred texts themselves record oral traditions, transmitted through song or chanted recitation. While songlines and sacred texts delineate the sacred in very different ways, they both can provide maps of reality, relating to sacred geography and the values of a community. They can be described, in Charlesworth’s phrase as ‘religious inventions’, providing a cultural code necessary for survival, perhaps in a similar way to genetic code within a living organism. (shrink)

This book consists of a long introductory essay by the editor followed by a wide selection of essays. In the Introduction, Charlesworth first surveys and assesses the problem and assorted proposed solutions, dividing his attention between "descriptivist" and "non-descriptivist" accounts. Examining appeals to religious experience to underwrite descriptivist analyses, he concludes that this approach is laden with difficulty. As he sees it, the meaning of religious language cannot typically be given by reference to religious experience because first, the conceptual (...) possibility of what the experiences are alleged to be of is at issue; secondly, direct experiences of the Holy are deemed to be "extraordinary and privileged," so that they could in no circumstances be the normal basis of belief, and finally, analogical predication is vitiated by our inability to know what such predicates mean as applied to God. Regarding the principle of verification, Charlesworth observes that whatever may be said about its logical status, "a lot of high sounding theological nonsense would be shown up for what it is if this simple rule of method were rigorously applied." On the non-descriptivist side, he considers some of the reductionist attempts—reduction to moral language or to an expression in terms of some secular practical commitment is criticized. (shrink)

In this article I try to refute the so-called "libertarian" theory of free will, and to examine how our conclusion ought to modify our common attitudes of praise and blame. In attacking the libertarian view, I shall try to show that it cannot be consistently stated. That is, my dscussion will be an "analytic-philosophic" one. I shall neglect what I think is in practice an equally powerful method of attack on the libertarian: a challenge to state his theory in such (...) a way that it will fit in the modern biology and psychology, which are becoming increasingly physicalistic. (shrink)

Until now, adult crying has received relatively little interest from investigators, whereas in the popular media there are many strong claims about crying (e.g., crying brings relief) of which the scientific basis is not clear. In this review, we provide an overview of the current state of the scientific literature with respect to crying. We identify gaps in knowledge and propose questions for future research. The following topics receive special attention: Ontogenetic development, antecedents, individual and gender differences, and the intra- (...) and interindividual effects of crying. We conclude that the study of crying may help us obtain better insight into human nature, that is, not only our emotional, but also social, and moral functioning. (shrink)

Two essays on utilitarianism, written from opposite points of view, by J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams. In the first part of the book Professor Smart advocates a modern and sophisticated version of classical utilitarianism; he tries to formulate a consistent and persuasive elaboration of the doctrine that the rightness and wrongness of actions is determined solely by their consequences, and in particular their consequences for the sum total of human happiness. In Part II Bernard Williams offers a sustained (...) and vigorous critique of utilitarian assumptions, arguments and ideals. He finds inadequate the theory of action implied by utilitarianism, and he argues that utilitarianism fails to engage at a serious level with the real problems of moral and political philosophy, and fails to make sense of notions such as integrity, or even human happiness itself. This book should be of interest to welfare economists, political scientists and decision-theorists. (shrink)